Amendment Batched Amendment - Strategy and Resource Director Proposal

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Should the document be ratified or amended as specified by the thread type?

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  • Abstain

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There are many options for not letting the supply float freely.
Yes, I literally said that. "A lot of options here". Also, there's nothing sudden about it. We have a ready token model to adjust and tweak, which we seem to want to do after deciding on structure and strategy. Until we get there, we can use the grant pool for some expenses.

This raises some issues. If the council has to play this active role and do strategic partnerships, exchanges and community, how will you keep it from interfering with the director?
They'll be people. Not scripted software. They can talk to each other.
 
Having a board above a director is common. Although we have ANOs basically already doing that, I could see the ANOs wanting a delegation to oversee the director.

Where it gets muddy if I interpret this proposal right is that the committee would both be a board and executive or management team to which the director has to answer. Yet if that board is also doing executive work it should be the other way around. So how would that work if a director is both responsible for the committee and the committee is doing the oversight?

Unless I am missing something here that will not work. Having a separate board overseeing the director, which in turn oversees an executive/management team or council will work, but that is a lot of boilerplate to start out with.

I cannot imagine that any director in this protocol would not work towards a structure like that, especially in the case a foundation gets founded as a legal person.
 
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Yes, I literally said that. "A lot of options here". Also, there's nothing sudden about it. We have a ready token model to adjust and tweak, which we seem to want to do after deciding on structure and strategy. Until we get there, we can use the grant pool for some expenses.
It is a sudden change that a discussion about the governance structure suddenly has to include a fundamental change of the tokenomics. That we seem to want to do something at some point is entirely your personal interpretation.

They'll be people. Not scripted software. They can talk to each other.
Like the ANOs? ;) All I’m saying is that maybe it is better to have a clear delineation between who does oversight at who executes.
 
Please explain to me how you would see this work? I am the one with both expertise, the network(and yes also flaws) to make it work if elected as director. Let's take the technicals as an example. The committee in this proposal has a technical person both in an oversight role and in an active role. I know there is nobody in this protocol that can bring both the network, vision and the technicals except for Paul, who is not really a CTO type of person. So the person in that committee would both be overseeing me, yet not be at my professional level and at the same time he/she would also be very active. It is the job of the director to ensure everything fits into place and is balanced. It means that is the role to make final decisions in day to day operations. Those could be conflicting with what the technical council person would like to see. So the director is bound and tied by the committee exerting control over the director and you expect the director to actually lead?

That is not kiss if you ask me. That is a recipe for failure, unless I am missing something miraculous in the proposal.
 
Having a board above a director is common. Although we have ANOs basically already doing that, I could see the ANOs wanting a delegation to oversee the director.
Yes. The often made comparison is that ANOs are the board. But for several reasons they don't make for a very good board. So we either need to take all kind of measures to improve their oversight, or just delegate that board-function away from them and let them be 'shareholders' that elect and oversee the 'board'.

What a board needs to do is represent the ANOs, be responsible for long-term strategy (can come from an appointed CTO), set policy and appoint executive management to carry out the day-to-day. So, the council is the board. The Director is the executive management. Council answers to ANOs. Director answers to Council. ANOs only answer to other ANOs.

So the person in that committee would both be overseeing me, yet not be at my professional level and at the same time he/she would also be very active.
The designations in the council can change. You want three generic council members? Okay. You want them designated in line with our shareholder diversity? Okay, but we only really have ANOs.

I'm not saying council members do a lot of work that intersects with management. But initially, policy set by the council may include a certain division of labor until we have the resources/hires to expand on executive management enough to cover all facets. We're likely not starting with everything in place. So for the council I do foresee some responsibilities e.g. communication with ANOs, because that's who they're accountable to. And that might as well be community management. I do foresee some outreach, because we all want to leverage our networks.
 
Like the ANOs? ;) All I’m saying is that maybe it is better to have a clear delineation between who does oversight at who executes
Exactly my point. It seems like a rather contrived solution to assert control. You either introduce a board (i would anyway introduce an advisory board btw) with the role of overseeing the director or you let ANOs do that.

Then you have the director being responsible for day to day operations. Then you have whatever structure below that which either directly executes or which is responsible for a certain area, like technical. Also something I obviously would introduce as a director.
 
You either introduce a board (i would anyway introduce an advisory board btw) with the role of overseeing the director or you let ANOs do that.
So we want the same thing? A board (not ANOs) overseeing the Director. The Director does the day-to-day and hires whatever talent it needs to carry out work.

What we're turning around here is that you want to appoint the board that oversees you. It should be the other way around. The board appoints you. Shareholders appoint the board.

I'm calling it a council etc because I doubt we should be using terminology like board. The purpose is the same, be a representation of the stakeholders/'shareholders'.
 
The designations in the council can change. You want three generic council members? Okay. You want them designated in line with our shareholder diversity? Okay, but we only really have ANOs
Nope that is not at all what I was saying. I am totally fine with having a board with people having diverse expertises. That is what you typically seek in a board. A party to also discuss with as a director.

The problem is with the fact those same board members are also doing executive work and thus should be accountable to the director.

The proposed solution is almost like a management/executive assistant or PA filling in the blanks between the committee. Not a director. The name 'director' basically already explains the function quite well. I am still thinking about how this ever could work out in reality and if it would work like this why you never see this happening in the wild.

Please let me be clear. I am open to all kinds of ideas, as long as they make sense to me. I simply cannot phantom how this could ever work. Could be one of my flaws of course ;)
 
The problem is with the fact those same board members are also doing executive work and thus should be accountable to the director.
Alright. So what if we make them stop doing executive work? Not sure I implied it anywhere. Just that they'd be doing more work than just oversight. At least initially.

The order btw should still be: ANOs elect the board. Board elects Director. Director hires whatever it needs. And accountability is then in the reverse order.
 
That is what never will work indeed. I made clear from the start I would be okay with a board:
Totally fine with making sure there's no overlap and that they don't do executive work. Initially I do foresee a more active board/council because it takes a while to get things in place.

If we have some support for ANOs electing a representative board that appoints/oversees a Director, that's fine with me.
 
The important thing is to ensure clean lines, otherwise we are setting ourselves up for failure. Somebody in a board should not be the executive guy in day to day operations, because then a conflict of interests is almost certain to happen at one point, simply because the director should be verified by the board and have an open dialog with them, but on the other hand should have the autonomy to make the actual decision in day to day operations that might not necessarily serve the best interest of that board person also doing executive work.
 
The often made comparison is that ANOs are the board. But for several reasons they don't make for a very good board. So we either need to take all kind of measures to improve their oversight, or just delegate that board-function away from them and let them be 'shareholders' that elect and oversee the 'board'.
I don’t wanna derail us too much here as it seems like we are slowly edging towards some consensus - however: If we simply accept the premise that ANOs do not have to provide oversight and do not have to bring usage to the protocol, one has to ask why we do not just fix the total ANO payout to an absolute number and let anyone who spins up a node get an equal share of the payout and a vote.... It is a rabbit hole to go down and it is not to really to push against some kind of oversight mechanism, i.e. a board. I also understand that ANOs are not exactly making lots of money, but still...
 
ANOs are the effective eventual decision makers as they run the software. I already mentioned before, and have been mentioning that forever that we need more standing parties. I also explained in this thread that it might not be the direct mandate of the director in current proposal, it is also not something you can leave as is. ANOs having no counterweight is a problem. The fact we are at a 30% average efficiency without insights into what is being brought to the protocol are things you cannot ignore when you are collaboratively moving towards a new direction for the protocol. Obviously a director cannot mandate that change, but I am confident that with a proper strategy, vision and execution plans the willingness to make it happen follows.

The board should not be in control of the ANOs. It is simply a representation currently of them, hopefully together with non ANO members overseeing the director, who in turn brings this protocol to execute actual change.
 
one has to ask why we do not just fix the total ANO payout to an absolute number and let anyone who spins up a node get an equal share of the payout and a vote
I asked Who a while back about making the authority set permissionless. The state of the code is such that operators need to be trusted, as someone with an authority node and a good understanding of the codebase could bring down the network.

I am in favour of reducing ANO payouts and having them be responsible only for network infrastructure though. I don’t think paying ANOs a large slice of inflation to “further the protocol” has been all that successful.
 
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TLDR: We seem close to a compromise. Can we now briefly pause to create a document that embodies this so that it can be ratified which was the intent of the original thread?

This document ratification began with asking some fundamental questions about managing strategy and resources. It further proposed mirroring successful business models. It followed and was in parallel with the work of the Governance Implementation Group which ended in two community preferences:
  • ANOs want to play a role in community decision making
  • ANOs have a slight preference to balance that decision making with a multi-member body
The intended subsequent debate has moved into this discussion thread which is good because we need to have it. Here the two counter-views about sole director versus council have been aired to the extent that we are at a good point for a solution.

That solution revolves around a merger of the two: a director who gets things done in a considered and agile way, who in turn reports to and advises a board. The board is responsible for long-term direction, provides high level objectives, guidance/support, and resources; they set community policy and report to stakeholders (ANOs, token holders etc).

This seems to meet all the needs identified. These are the clear lines of authority and accountability we have been missing. The director is empowered and represents the active focus of the enterprise. I am supportive of this which leaves just one question: given that we started with document ratification can we now rapidly & jointly create a document which embodies this collective agreement so that it can be ratified and we can move forward at the pace we now need to?
 

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Jason Gregoire has made a motion to extend the discussion. If someone seconds this motion by selecting the button below, a vote on the motion will start.

A majority voting yay will pass the motion and the discussion will be extended for 72 hours. This motion will remain open until the normal discussion period ends or a motion to end the discussion is passed by a majority.
 

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Mike Buckingham has seconded the motion to extend the discussion.

A motion is now active at the top of this thread to vote if you want to extend the discussion. A majority voting yes will pass the motion and the discussion will be extended for 72 hours. This vote will remain open until the normal discussion period ends or another motion is passed.
 
one has to ask why we do not just fix the total ANO payout to an absolute number and let anyone who spins up a node get an equal share of the payout and a vote..
I've always been in favor of all ANOs moving to the same efficiency (or getting rid of the concept altogether). We can't monitor ANOs who set a certain efficiency level for 'furthering the protocol'. With the ANO>board>director structure, their role is reduced so variable payments make even less sense (but they're still in control). That said, it'll have to be something for later, because we'd risk stepping outside the scope of support.

can we now rapidly & jointly create a document which embodies this collective agreement so that it can be ratified and we can move forward at the pace we now need to?
I'm more than willing to draft something based on the current Director proposal and my earlier edits to it. I'll then share it directly with interested parties for feedback & editing. Once parties are happy, we can merge it with this vote. Time is running a bit short, though, so voting for a second (and likely final) discussion extension would be great.

If anyone has any other ideas, I'm all ears.
 
Too bad there seems to be a misunderstanding I guess.

That solution revolves around a merger of the two: a director who gets things done in a considered and agile way, who in turn reports to and advises a board.
Totally agreed. Having a board, although not strictly necessary because ANOs could already fulfill that position is certainly something any director would be okay with probably. The board can serve as a sounding board, and ensures the director does what he/she is hired to do.
The board is responsible for long-term direction, provides high level objectives, guidance/support, and resources; they set community policy and report to stakeholders (ANOs, token holders etc).
That is where it goes wrong. I have been trying to explain over and over that this I would be handling it like an interim manager. What you sketch here is nice when the protocol lands on its feet for a bit and when the vision/strategy and plans have been laid out and put into effect mostly. When the term of the director is roughly up and we either have or a close to having medium and long term plans for the protocol.

It totally doesn't make sense to me to have a protocol somehow magically have multiple people, that have not been able to follow proper approaches and just started with a roadmap and tokenomics and than reversing into "vision", nor a representation of the protocol that has been unable to come to consensus at all last 1.5 years, would be directing a director with experience, expertise and big network. I don't know in what world that would work.

Again please. This is in interim situation, where you start at the opposite end. Build in as much oversight as you want, but please do not have a body of people directing the director at this point. I know I can change it around. Given from what I have seen till date I am less than confident parties in the protocol will come together with the same decisiveness and execution.

So to make it clear. If the vision is that the board really is doing the direction, I am certainly not interested, because I know it will fail at current point. If that is the goal for 9-12 months when the dust has settled, I am all up for it, as I am probably only interested during the interim period only, handing over day to day operation to someone else at that point.
 
Again please. This is in interim situation, where you start at the opposite end. Build in as much oversight as you want, but please do not have a body of people directing the director at this point. I know I can change it around. Given from what I have seen till date I am less than confident parties in the protocol will come together with the same decisiveness and execution.

So to make it clear. If the vision is that the board really is doing the direction, I am certainly not interested, because I know it will fail at current point. If that is the goal for 9-12 months when the dust has settled, I am all up for it, as I am probably only interested during the interim period only, handing over day to day operation to someone else at that point.
@WB and @Mike Buckingham
I'm thinking that we write into the proposal that a board is to be formed after 9 months. Is this a compromise you can accept?

Thank you
 
So to make it clear. If the vision is that the board really is doing the direction, I am certainly not interested, because I know it will fail at current point. If that is the goal for 9-12 months when the dust has settled, I am all up for it, as I am probably only interested during the interim period only, handing over day to day operation to someone else at that point.
I think this is a misunderstanding on semantics. The board is accountable for long-term direction. It needs to outline to the stakeholders/ANOs what the direction is and how they're moving towards it. If the stakeholders don't think this is working out as intended, they replace the board. If the board receives from the Director what the direction/strategy is, that's fine. But they're accountable for it.

I'm perfectly fine with a Director setting that all out for 9 months and then transitioning. But let's start out with a board and keep that clear chain of accountability.
 
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I think this is a misunderstanding on semantics. The board is accountable for long-term direction. It needs to outline to the stakeholders/ANOs what the direction is and how they're moving towards it. If the shareholders don't think this is working out as intended, they replace the board. If the board receives from the Director what the direction/strategy is, that's fine. But they're accountable for it.
Yupz long-term direction from multiple people that forgot to do proper analysis, strategy and plans in the first place? How?

For me this simply boils down to trust:

  • You either trust the director to be capable of acting as an interim manager in getting the protocol to the next phase, where we end up with a structure somewhere in the middle of what we have now and the interim situation. That means letting go some of the control for some people and accepting that we have been steerless till date
  • I don't trust current standing parties to being able to form the long-term direction at this point, because for that you need the work I would start doing as explained in this thread. Which has not been done till date (mentioned that many times) and thus we would have a body that is responsible for something which they have and/or could not execute themselves responsible for it. That is also why this very much is an interim job and why I would be up for it during that period only (I am even okay with having a max seat duration in there).
 
You either trust the director to be capable of acting as an interim manager in getting the protocol to the next phase, where we end up with a structure somewhere in the middle of what we have now and the interim situation. That means letting go some of the control for some people and accepting that we have been steerless till date
I don't think anyone really disagrees.

The board helps because ANOs are prone to weak oversight. It also helps because a board is a better soundboard for a Director than 18+ parties with widely divergent opinions. It also helps because it shields the Director from being accountable directly to the stakeholders, which is especially important when we're getting some unpopular decisions. Like I said yesterday, I think this is the ideal compromise.

So this is what we need from the start. Not after 9 months.
 
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