Executive Committee feedback

The new Governance Implementation Group as announced here has been hard at work to flesh out the GWG proposal.

Current members are:

@Saul Schwartzbach
@WB
@Mike Buckingham
@Matthias Fortin
@Jason Gregoire

We’ve discussed the details and allocated the needed work for phase one (committee framework + roadmap). Early drafts of all required governance updates are now in place and currently being reviewed. We are also creating new documents where need be, for instance a Doc 008 to handle voting.

Part of phase one is that we promised to hold a community-wide discussion on the Executive Committee to discuss its merits/flaws as we seek to iterate on its model. Please keep discussion limited to the EC and its implications, rather than comments on the GWG proposal as a whole.

This discussion will run for eight days after which we see if some or all of the concerns have been alleviated.


__________

In a decentralized, leaderless environment, decisions are often made based on ‘one-person-one-vote’. There is no inherent filter to make sure the vote is useful or effective. What’s more, the larger the pool of equal voters, the larger the risk of indecision due to disagreement. This is commonly referred to as ‘decision/design by committee’.

While our framework of funneling a portion of vote power through expert groups is an improvement, these groups themselves are ironically still susceptible to the common pitfalls of ‘decision by committee’. Consensus may still be hard to find within committees and decisions consequently take longer to reach.

The Factom protocol committees therefore act as decision-aiding entities that collectively make up a decision-making, representative Executive Committee (EC).

In this way, we protect positive decision-by-committee aspects (collaboration, direct input) through the underlying committees, while offsetting its numerous limitations (i.e. deadlocks, inefficiency) by maintaining a measure of much needed leadership and decisiveness.


There are a number of concerns about the Executive Committee

  1. It reaches the required quota (currently 51%) too easily and gains in power as ANO numbers drop.
  2. Standing is not robust enough and ANOs may fear being booted so the EC gains in power.
  3. An EC is inferior to leaving vote power with each individual committee.

1. The quota & power problem
If we play devil’s advocate, we may assume that any EC vote (32%) is always followed by 4 ANOs (the ANOs of EC representatives).

It is also more likely that the absent or less active ANOs are those not directly involved with the EC. Therefore, as these ANOs drop out or become inactive, the 68% total ANO vote moves in favor of the ANOs backing the EC.

Without going into long and complicated details, this does lead to the EC gaining in power. With no measures and keeping things as is (51% quota and 5-10% absent parties), the critical minimum number of ANOs is 24. See: (in this example, the abstaining votes reflect the absent votes).

To address this it is suggested that we:
  • Impose a quorum of 75% to make a vote valid. This removes the impact of absent parties and the 68% ANO vote will be calculated based on members present (see Robert’s Rules of Order).

    A quorum is not perfect. @Niels Klomp will affirm that in Dutch parliament, 32 MPs recently ‘fled’ to prevent the quorum from being hit on a motion. We can, however, encourage ANOs to participate very effectively through Standing.

With the above measure, the safe minimum ANO number drops to 18, a very significant drop from 24. At around 13-14 ANOs, the EC will essentially always have a majority under the assumption that it always has four ANOs backing it.

Additionally:
  • Raise the vote majority from 51% to 55%, making it harder for an EC (and ANOs) to win a vote, but increasing the risk of deadlocks.
  • Introduce a transparent vote record for internal EC votes.
  • Enable a removal scheme initiated by other committees/standing parties for an EC member representing a failed/inactive committee.
We are also open to discussing changing the EC percentage from 32% to something lower. This hasn’t been modeled yet. The above measures do their job, and need to be part of any serious governance system anyway. Combining them with a lower EC vote may be too much.


2. The Standing problem
Standing is mostly broken due to apathy and the fear of conflict. It’s also a lot of work for those who do take it seriously. This topic is not to decide how we handle standing in detail, as that’s reserved for phase two, but here’s what we would suggest to alleviate the concern of an EC seeking to boot ANOs and risk dropping below a critical minimum number.

It is proposed that standing determination becomes an objective checklist of updated core requirements (this is how the EC was going to score anyway!). Our overall proposal very easily adds worthwhile criteria with effective monitoring through the Secretary and standardized reports.

Such an objective checklist would include:

1. Active participation in a committee (monitored through secretary/committee reporting)
2. Actively helping towards a roadmap objective (co-authored operational docs/sponsor/feasibility study/liaise with external grant submitters)
3. Reporting & voting requirements (uphold cadence, vote record)
4. Server management
5. EC usage
6. ???

We allocate weights to each criteria or ‘core requirement’. Currently, we imagine that if you only did server management, you would be at a low enough standing level to warrant a removal vote. This kind of objectivity would negate bias in the EC’s power in having a party removed. Parties are responsible for their own standing level.

Scoring this kind of mutually agreed checklist no longer requires every ANO to participate. This can be done through a smaller group, thereby saving everyone a lot of time.

3. Give power to each individual committee.
Having four separate, major voting groups will foster tribalism, which we don’t think is desirable. Part of combating the negative aspects of “decision by committee” is that you add a layer of decisiveness. The EC does so quite effectively while still keeping a lot of the organisation reasonably flat.
 
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  • A quorum is not perfect. @Niels Klomp will affirm that in Dutch parliament, 32 MPs recently ‘fled’ to prevent the quorum from being hit on a motion. We can, however, encourage ANOs to participate very effectively through Standing.
Don't want to sidetrack the discussion. That example was a an individual vote with some odd circumstances.

Within our multiparty system normaly the different political parties vote with one vote per party, taking into account their number of seats in parlement to reach a quorum (one party, one voice/vote). A vote which didn't pass before was now put to an individual vote per parlement member. This was a trick because opposition was aware of the fact that because of Covid (not all parlement members are allowed to be in parlement at the same time) and vacation there was a majority of individual opposition members present in parlement, giving them the upperhand they would never had without Covid and vacations.

The parlement members fleeing parlement to ensure quorum wasn't reached was not nice from a democratic point of view, but opposition also used a clever trick and the speaker of the house forgot to apply the covid rule that individual votes should be announced ahead of times. So this was also a failure in applying the rules. The outrage about members fleeing the building overtook the other 2 'problems' in all news, which is understandable because opposition was outraged obviously

So not really sure if that helps here. Just wanted to explain the circumstances and I personally believe quorums to not have many problems
 
Regarding the EC. I see some big power centralization issues. Given the idea is/was to have the EC also be responsible for promotions/demotions of ANOs you will get bias towards what the EC members are deciding and ensuring you keep them as a friend at all times, removing critical approaches to situations.

An EC without vote delegation is not the way to go IMO, so although you ask to keep this about the EC alone, I see no way to not have a holistic approach to it.

I think we all agree on these facts:
  • the protocol has a need for several expertise areas: governance, marketing, development, community etcetera
  • not every ANO has members that have expertise in all these areas, so they either are not involved, vote uninformed or with a gut feeling.
  • not every ANO should be asked/expected to be involved in every matter.

If we all agree on the above, you quite quuckly start thinking in committees. That is something we have right now, with the strange thing, that in the end these committees are not really driving decisions themselves, since they still require votes from all ANOs in a lot of cases, coming back to the above problems.

Now you can either add an executive layer for the decision making, very much like a board of directors or steering group (the EC as it is proposed now), or you can have the committee chairmans meet , to ensure the committees work well together and thus keep the decision making in the individual committees.

I personally like the last approach, provided that the following becomes in place:
  • ANOs describe which area(s) of expertise they hold amongst their members and why they feel they are qualified.
  • We create buckets for vote delegation in these areas.
  • We create buckets in the grant process, giving the different areas a 'budget'
  • Votes are announced by the respective committees. If an ANO does not posess a certain skill they can only vote by delegation, if they do poses a certain skill they can still vote by delegation or they can vote themselves directly. This solves the problem of every ANO having to know everything. It also exloses ANOs with many different skills but never voting themselves or being involved in committees.

The above automatically rebalances/ensures the knowledgeable and respected people have a say in their area of expertise. It also ensures that within a committee and thus expertise area the best interests of the protocol are served when it comes to votes.

Then you are still left with ensuring the overarching collaboration between expertise areas takes place. I see that as part of the committees and their chairs. I would like to see quarterly or bi-monthly meetings where committees together with ANOs can set the agenda. ANOs are welcome and even promoted to join these meetings, but they are mainly driven by the committees.

To conclude, my problem with the EC is. That works very wel in situations where there really is a hierarchy or centralized decision making. Except here we are literally all equals and then introduce something that can both make decisions for me and even about me, meaning we apparently are not equal at all, bringing all kinds of politics in play.
 
So not really sure if that helps here. Just wanted to explain the circumstances and I personally believe quorums to not have many problems
Oh I agree. A quorum is very necessary. The risks of abuse are slightly higher for a smaller community like Factom than, say, Dutch parliament, but that's why we need to better tackle any repercussions through standing.

Now you can either add an executive layer for the decision making, very much like a board of directors or steering group (the EC as it is proposed now), or you can have the committee chairmans meet , to ensure the committees work well together and thus keep the decision making in the individual committees.
The EC is a combination of the two choices you've listed. It's a 'permanent' meeting between committees where each representative is expected to push the vote of its committee. Maybe that isn't clear enough.

Whereas a board of directors/CEO may take input from lower levels/departments to reach a decision, the EC is expected to take input from their respective committees and represent their thinking. Sure, they can just vote any way they wish, but that's why we make EC votes transparent and have schemes in place to avoid representation of inactive/unrepresented committees. Committees themselves will be able to flip their representation around if it's failing. Comparably, I don't think a CMO can be replaced by its marketing department.

Essentially, we envision that committees in this way do hold power, but as stated 'decision by committee' can be a real problem and so it's a lot better to keep the actual vote with a group of 4 representatives than say with individual committees of 10+ members each. In my view, that's a fair balance between both worlds, where we want to stay decentralized and somewhat flat, but also want to be more decisive than we are now.

I like your idea about buckets, and it's not impossible to fit into the EC model. The original GWG proposal stated:

"It is anticipated that, dependent on subject, the most appropriate Executive Committee member would be most influential. For example, on topics of a technical nature, the Technology Committee representative would take a lead role"

One option for this is having a dynamic internal vote system for the EC. Based on a set of community-determined criteria, a timed discussion is given a certain label (tech/outreach) by the Secretary – or as you mentioned, the relevant Committee posts a timed discussion under their expertise label - and the relevant EC representative gets a bigger internal vote. This adds more power to committees (and their representative) in their respective field, which is ideally how it should work.

There will always be involvement of parties in unrelated fields, it's not something we can or should shut off entirely. Particularly because 'fields of expertise' are not that black and white. Certain tech decisions (changing the tokenomics?) will have marketing implications. Certain governance decisions have tech implications (how do we translate this on-chain, etc). Considering that, I think a dynamic EC vote is a decent system reflecting much of the above.

There will be endless discussion about that overlap if we try to make it black & white through delegation or not, let alone the discussions about if an ANO really has that expertise.
 
Given the idea is/was to have the EC also be responsible for promotions/demotions of ANOs you will get bias towards what the EC members are deciding and ensuring you keep them as a friend at all times, removing critical approaches to situations
I sort of covered this in the first post under point two. With the current standing system, yes, there would be bias. However, if we change the core requirements to add standing criteria that are both a value-add and able to be monitored, this is no longer a problem.
 
Except you can never remove all subjectiveness.

Take for instance your own scores on ANOs that do development work. It has something like 3 values. How do you come to these values, because it is a combination of quantative and qualitative analysis if you want to do it properly. The sheer amount of work makes that impossible and the qualitative bit of it is by definition subjective.

Same for stuff like bizdev. You can try to measure the outcome because that is objective. Except that completely negates all factors that go into it, like typed of customers, partners, projects. One of the reasons why you see for instance Layertech being moved out of the ANO set soon, whilst they are one of the parties that can really move the needle. If you believe that these parties are going to share in depth details you are wrong. The fact they haven't at this point should say enough.

So objective measurements sound really nice. Except they either do not capture the full spectrum or there will still be subjectiveness. If you then are amongst equals, but make a body that decides about these equal peers, you are bringing in politics again
 
Take for instance your own scores on ANOs that do development work. It has something like 3 values. How do you come to these values, because it is a combination of quantative and qualitative analysis if you want to do it properly. The sheer amount of work makes that impossible and the qualitative bit of it is by definition subjective.
I agree, so any requirements don't have values. They become a simple yes/no if we are able to monitor them.*

Active in committee? Yes/no.
Active in roadmap work? Yes/no.

These are activities that are public, add value and are subject to better reporting than we have now. This might mean that in order to get max standing, an ANO can't really afford to not be in a committee, but is that a bad thing?

One of the reasons why you see for instance Layertech being moved out of the ANO set soon, whilst they are one of the parties that can really move the needle.
No one really wants in-depth details at this stage. Regardless of who you are or how many clients you've brought in, if you've not said a single word publicly ever since your standing has been slipping (this has been six months in the making) then basic social dynamics dictate that the 'group' will turn against you.

Those dynamics can suck, because there's absolutely no reason why a Hashquark needs to be at twice the standing of Layertech, but (at the very least sporadic) communication is what an ANO signs up for and I'm also pretty sure that the above disparity clears up very fast with a revised list of requirements.

* I'm with you on bizdev and I want to figure it out. We can't pin down requirements for those. I've long been an advocate for a separate standing category for bizdev ANOs who can't offer full transparency and lack the time to engage with the community (note: that doesn't mean zero communication, either). This would be paired with some kind of vote delegation.
 
It feels like this is becoming overly complicated. We need an EC that can take decisions, that will contain elements of centralisation.

The EC or committee chairs need to be supported by the community, and trust given to them to make decisions. Not everyone is going to like every decision, I don’t want to see endless campaigns to override the EC.

This is focussed on a system that assumes the EC will become tyrannical and must have votes overridden by the community.

If we get to that stage - the Committees and the ANOs as well as the EC have all failed.

Overriding one decision from a tyrannical EC won’t solve the communities long-term misrepresentation.

Its better to come at the issue from the other side: by including provisions to quickly replace a tyrannical EC if needed.
 
It feels like this is becoming overly complicated. We need an EC that can take decisions, that will contain elements of centralisation.

The EC or committee chairs need to be supported by the community, and trust given to them to make decisions. Not everyone is going to like every decision, I don’t want to see endless campaigns to override the EC.

This is focussed on a system that assumes the EC will become tyrannical and must have votes overridden by the community.

If we get to that stage - the Committees and the ANOs as well as the EC have all failed.

Overriding one decision from a tyrannical EC won’t solve the communities long-term misrepresentation.

Its better to come at the issue from the other side: by including provisions to quickly replace a tyrannical EC if needed.
I think Colin makes a good point about arguing on the basis that the EC becomes tyrannical. Is it likely, did the Guides behave in this way? I think not. Is there much motivation for this type of behaviour? Well ultimately should the protocol become really significant, we get the use and the revenues then yes there could be power struggles. Such struggles would need to involve all/most members of the EC, all of whom in the new model may be relatively easily unseated.

Lets focus our energies on working out how to make this work given that one of our biggest gaps is lack of decisiveness which is exactly what the EC seeks to provide. Colin's suggestion about including provisions to quickly replace a tyrannical EC if needed is one such way.
 
It feels very much like people expecting this to remove politics, whilst it merely shifts politics and will not change things dramatically. I have mentioned in the past you need people with executive powers. I see the EC as an attempt to introduce something like that, but not in a way that is sustainable to me

As long as we are all peers and equals, the EC will get into politics. People are also very gullible towards power the introduction of an EC has on these peers. You well get people that agree with the EC afraid of repercussions. The biggest flaw is making the EC responsible for promotion/demotion and thus artificially introducing certain parties with more powers.

Without introducing additional standing parties and delegation that is just shifting politics and nothing more. It also already very clear which parties are very in favor and even warming up their seats as well as what proposals will come next from the future EC members.
 
@Mike Buckingham , replacing a tyrannical EC will not happen without additional standing parties or vote delegation. Parties that are afraid of being kicked out will be the last to speak up or act. We are already in a state where the people with real voices have moved on or are not properly engaged anymore.

It is so artificial in a place where everyone still is eachothers equal (the old boys ANO club). Please focus on standing party and vote delegation introduction so people get their priorities straight.

--
But I will let others speak and stay on the sideline
 
@Mike Buckingham , replacing a tyrannical EC will not happen without additional standing parties or vote delegation. Parties that are afraid of being kicked out will be the last to speak up or act. We are already in a state where the people with real voices have moved on or are not properly engaged anymore.

It is so artificial in a place where everyone still is eachothers equal (the old boys ANO club). Please focus on standing party and vote delegation introduction so people get their priorities straight.

--
But I will let others speak and stay on the sideline
Hi Niels,

I don't think anyone wants you just on the sideline.

I agree that we need additional standing parties and nothing proposed here excludes that. Similarly I believe that nothing excludes vote delegation. There is indeed the opportunity for vote emulation in the short term (by copying the EC vote for example). This should be informed because it comes from committees comprised of experienced people with the appropriate expertise.

The EC proposal endeavours to address your concern that the Factom community is an artificial place where everyone is each others equal by providing some necessary leadership.

Lets have you where you belong ...on the pitch.
 
The protocol needs big changes throughout. That will require an executive mandate.

Decentralised Governance does not work for a startup. We have proved that spectacularly. For an established project however, it might.

Let’s put a benevolent EC in place for a year, make the changes required, then return power to a distributed set of standing parties. If ppl don’t like how its turned out after that year of change, then they can leave or fork or change it back through consensus.

This EC needs a mandate to effect changes to ensure we evolve and survive.
 
Yupz except the EC as it is proposed now will not work. You either bring in outside people with no ties to the standing parties to make this work or you bring additional standing parties to make it work.

This is like employees at equal pay scales / positions running a business.
Promoting employees means they get executive/management control, which automatically means you are not equal anymore (to be clear you are equal as people, but definitely not in control/influence in a company). When there is no equality anymore, it means people will fall in line or move elsewhere. With jobs that is easy with a protocol well, you don't want some of your parties to leave. But trying to portray this as that there will be no separation in ANO levels, or removal of politics is just looking the other way because we have failed in the past. Again the biggest problem around this is the fact that somehow some people find it a good idea to give the EC too much power in an area they should have no power, removing it from the collective.

BTW I am interested to hear input from the legal working group. Because an EC also deciding who comes and who goes, together with the direction of the protocol, very much seems like the definition of a common enterprise to me (managerial role).
 
Sure, the EC needs to be under a NPO. Like all the other protocols that have managed to achieve effective leadership and fundraising.

An EC needs to be public facing and accountable. Not a bunch of discord avatars.

If we treat them with mistrust and suspicion it’s not going to work either.

We have arguably 50% of voting base giving essentially blanket support, against best interests of the protocol and effectively overruling clear evidence not to.

We should be careful about giving the same ability to overrule the EC.
 
Just some text from the SEC https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets

A purchaser may expect to realize a return through participating in distributions or through other methods of realizing appreciation on the asset, such as selling at a gain in a secondary market. When a promoter, sponsor, or other third party (or affiliated group of third parties) (each, an "Active Participant" or "AP") provides essential managerial efforts that affect the success of the enterprise, and investors reasonably expect to derive profit from those efforts, then this prong of the test is met.
EC? -> check

Although no one of the following characteristics is necessarily determinative, the stronger their presence, the more likely it is that a purchaser of a digital asset is relying on the "efforts of others":

  • An AP is responsible for the development, improvement (or enhancement), operation, or promotion of the network,[15] particularly if purchasers of the digital asset expect an AP to be performing or overseeing tasks that are necessary for the network or digital asset to achieve or retain its intended purpose or functionality.[16]
    • Where the network or the digital asset is still in development and the network or digital asset is not fully functional at the time of the offer or sale, purchasers would reasonably expect an AP to further develop the functionality of the network or digital asset (directly or indirectly). This particularly would be the case where an AP promises further developmental efforts in order for the digital asset to attain or grow in value.
  • There are essential tasks or responsibilities performed and expected to be performed by an AP, rather than an unaffiliated, dispersed community of network users (commonly known as a "decentralized" network).
  • An AP creates or supports a market for,[17] or the price of, the digital asset. This can include, for example, an AP that: (1) controls the creation and issuance of the digital asset; or (2) takes other actions to support a market price of the digital asset, such as by limiting supply or ensuring scarcity, through, for example, buybacks, "burning," or other activities.
  • An AP has a lead or central role in the direction of the ongoing development of the network or the digital asset. In particular, an AP plays a lead or central role in deciding governance issues, code updates, or how third parties participate in the validation of transactions that occur with respect to the digital asset.
  • An AP has a continuing managerial role in making decisions about or exercising judgment concerning the network or the characteristics or rights the digital asset represents including, for example:
    • Determining whether and how to compensate persons providing services to the network or to the entity or entities charged with oversight of the network.
    • Determining whether and where the digital asset will trade. For example, purchasers may reasonably rely on an AP for liquidity, such as where the AP has arranged, or promised to arrange for, the trading of the digital asset on a secondary market or platform.
    • Determining who will receive additional digital assets and under what conditions.
    • Making or contributing to managerial level business decisions, such as how to deploy funds raised from sales of the digital asset.
    • Playing a leading role in the validation or confirmation of transactions on the network, or in some other way having responsibility for the ongoing security of the network.
    • Making other managerial judgements or decisions that will directly or indirectly impact the success of the network or the value of the digital asset generally.
  • Purchasers would reasonably expect the AP to undertake efforts to promote its own interests and enhance the value of the network or digital asset, such as where:
    • The AP has the ability to realize capital appreciation from the value of the digital asset. This can be demonstrated, for example, if the AP retains a stake or interest in the digital asset. In these instances, purchasers would reasonably expect the AP to undertake efforts to promote its own interests and enhance the value of the network or digital asset.
    • The AP distributes the digital asset as compensation to management or the AP's compensation is tied to the price of the digital asset in the secondary market. To the extent these facts are present, the compensated individuals can be expected to take steps to build the value of the digital asset.
    • The AP owns or controls ownership of intellectual property rights of the network or digital asset, directly or indirectly.
    • The AP monetizes the value of the digital asset, especially where the digital asset has limited functionality.
And to be clear, introducing another entity still makes that entity an AP

@Colin Campbell This is not about mistrust or suspicion at all. This is about trying to create something artificial as long as there is still one standing party type and every vote still is the same.
 
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Yupz except the EC as it is proposed now will not work. You either bring in outside people with no ties to the standing parties to make this work or you bring additional standing parties to make it work.
Committees can appoint external people as their representative. But out of interest, why would this suddenly make it work? Implied power resides with the committees, which you argued is the better way forward anyway, the representative just represents and is easily removed.

BTW I am interested to hear input from the legal working group. Because an EC also deciding who comes and who goes, together with the direction of the protocol, very much seems like the definition of a common enterprise to me (managerial role).
That's not very fair. We offered the community a choice. Either the EC exclusively does standing determinations based on set criteria, or we keep allowing every ANO to cast votes.

I now propose that we simplify standing by adding what we think really adds value to the core requirements (committee/roadmap work is a good one). Essentially these should be yes/no decisions. It's then the individual ANO who decides their own standing by either respecting or not respecting the revised core requirements.

Whoever ends up casting the standing determination (maybe a community-wide vote window every xx months?), even at the lowest possible standing level, we can make it so that demotion is not immediate, but subject to a vote/hearing again involving all Standing Parties.

When a promoter, sponsor, or other third party (or affiliated group of third parties) (each, an "Active Participant" or "AP") provides essential managerial efforts that affect the success of the enterprise, and investors reasonably expect to derive profit from those efforts, then this prong of the test is met.
The only managerial effort the EC would provide is coordination for a roadmap. Committees do the managing, the EC is a permanent meeting between the committees. The vote power resides with them to avoid indecision and rivalry with other committees and is to be strictly representative. I've already outlined the difference versus traditional CMO/CEO roles.

The trick here is to avoid that the EC has ultimate control over any process. If you think it has ultimate control somewhere, great, let's change it.

Furthermore, it's worth noting that the statute of limitations for the SEC is five years. Factom Inc's ICO ended May 15th, 2015. That doesn't exclude us 100%, but it's worth considering that 2020 is a great year to take some more 'risk' while avoiding the ultimate control I mentioned above.
 
I'm personally not a fan of EC having so much power over who is in the club and who isn't. If we had more standing parties, this would be less of an issue for me. I think Niels expressed/nailed my concerns really well here.

Also, I am not convinced that adding the necessity for committee/roadmap work is the way to go. Why is it that the bureaucratic/politic sides were privileged over the business ones? I personally would rather see 24 ANOs with business outreach over 24 ANOs doing comittee work, but eh that's just me. To me, all this paper pushing is in general counter productive and we should avoid falling into this trap.

I still believe a system of ANO with equal efficiency 60-70%, node expectations and etc would be preferable to this complex system. Grant pool would have more funds, less "secret projects", less politics, more simplified.

While I see the SEC issue, I think it is time to take calculated risk.
 
I still believe a system of ANO with equal efficiency 60-70%, node expectations and etc would be preferable to this complex system. Grant pool would have more funds, less "secret projects", less politics, more simplified.
A system in which node operators just have to operate nodes and nothing else would be great, but we'd still need to figure out a decent way to allocate those nodes. The politics will remain for as long as operators have to be their own gatekeepers.
 
I'm personally not a fan of EC having so much power over who is in the club and who isn't. If we had more standing parties, this would be less of an issue for me. I think Niels expressed/nailed my concerns really well here.

Also, I am not convinced that adding the necessity for committee/roadmap work is the way to go. Why is it that the bureaucratic/politic sides were privileged over the business ones? I personally would rather see 24 ANOs with business outreach over 24 ANOs doing comittee work, but eh that's just me. To me, all this paper pushing is in general counter productive and we should avoid falling into this trap.

I still believe a system of ANO with equal efficiency 60-70%, node expectations and etc would be preferable to this complex system. Grant pool would have more funds, less "secret projects", less politics, more simplified.

While I see the SEC issue, I think it is time to take calculated risk.
Hi Miguel,

You make some very good points.

You ask the question: "Why is it that the bureaucratic/politic sides were privileged over the business ones?

Could you clarify exactly what you mean by this? I ask because there is no point doing committtee work unless there is specific benefit from it and also because I agree that business outreach is important. Like you I want to be sure that business outreach is not ignored or its role lessened. There is an outreach committee that I would consider to include such aspects. Does that work for you?
 
BTW I am interested to hear input from the legal working group. Because an EC also deciding who comes and who goes, together with the direction of the protocol, very much seems like the definition of a common enterprise to me (managerial role).
LRWG is pretty much dead seeing as how the integral member is part of an ANO being removed in spite of the countless hours she has given to this protocol (not to mention that her research will be used for NPO selection should we go that route). But hey, at least the majority of ANOs are still supporting ANOs that have literally done nothing and largely don't even show up.

With that type of incredible business acumen, as well as our amazing 2.5 year track record, I have no doubt that the protocol is destined for success!
 
I'm personally not a fan of EC having so much power over who is in the club and who isn't. If we had more standing parties, this would be less of an issue for me. I think Niels expressed/nailed my concerns really well here.
Happy to figure out a way to revise standing and how we handle promotions/demotions. The point was never to have the EC determine who gets in or gets out. That's not interesting to me at all. Something to the effect of what Colin posted is fine by me. Fixed standing+efficiency level for ANOs. If they want additional standing, great, do active committee/roadmap work. Then there's staking which under FPoS becomes an electoral component where each ANO needs a certain minimum amount of FCT staked with it?

Point is, if you have a way to exclude the EC from standing determinations and simplify standing+efficiency, I'm all ears. The EC is here for improved collaboration/decisiveness between committees. I mention the 'leaderless' problem in my OP for a good reason. It's not something we can ignore and keep every voice equal.

I personally would rather see 24 ANOs with business outreach over 24 ANOs doing comittee work, but eh that's just me.
We've hardly had any applications. Part of that is because no one knows us. Part of it is the time sink of all the peer evaluation & subsequent arguing. Another part is the measly rewards versus that time sink, so participation is currently a net negative.

I envision it gets easier by adding the committee framework. It adds structure to efforts that are currently short-lived and random. It adds informed decisiveness to give external parties a clear idea of what we're doing. It removes a lot of paper pushing by adding a dedicated Secretary role and hopefully by culling all the peer evaluation as alluded to above (we were going to allow easy emulation of the EC standing vote based on community-agreed metrics).

The question then becomes, how much influence should committees under an EC vote have, and I've sketched how that would look in my OP.
 
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