Factom Governance Improvement Proposal

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Do you approve this proposal and support the formation of a Working Group for its implementation?


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I want to say that reworking the governance of Factom around working groups is a good idea, broadly speaking. I also think having regular virtual conferences is a very good idea, and I am aware of some rather powerful conferencing software that could be of general use to the Factom community for this purpose.

That said, the many odd turns and twists of this particular proposal would require some significant amount of work before it could be approved.

I believe we should have is a constitutional convention, virtually, and run it for as long as it takes to beat out a new path forward. And such a convention could be open to more than just the ANOs, as we have quite a number of stakeholders in the community outside the ANOs.
 
[caveat : I have tried to go through all the messages before posting this - in advance, sorry if some answers have already been brought to the questions below]

Let me start first by a big thank you to all of you guys to bring this proposal on the table. It brings back optimism to all of us and makes the reality of healthier discussions back again.

This proposal covers the main challenges of our protocol: Strategic vision, Standing System and Resources/efficiency. I would like to discuss each of these items below.

Strategic vision
The way I read this proposal is that it has been mainly structured around the will to have a strategic vision and a kind of "legal/executive body" to support it and move it forward. This strategic vision is the roadmap. The pseudo legal/executive body is the EC.

This has many benefits:
  • a priori a better allocation of the resources toward common technical objectives thanks to the helps of expert committees;
  • common objectives which make easier the communication and the marketing actions to promote the Factom protocol as a whole ;
  • it enables competition between developers to propose the best solution on pre-fixed goals ;
  • it encourages standing parties to participate in order to have a say in the direction followed by the protocol ;
There is for us no discussion about the benefits that such an executive team would bring.

(It is not explicit but I do expect these committees to be open to the whole community. Is that correct?)

Standing system
Beyond this executive power it is proposed that the EC gets voting power in the standing system. If I read correctly, I also understand that this is also accompanied by a recommendation: that ANOs resign their ability to cast individual standing determination.

This recommendation looks paradoxical with the will of offsetting the “curator risk” by maintaining a balance of power between parties. So here are my first questions:

  • Could you clarify how you imagine in practice this standing system?
  • Do you expect most of the ANOs to delegate their vote power to the EC?
  • What dynamic do you envision with such a system?
This point is not really clear to me in this document whereas the long-term dynamic of the standing system will mainly depend on this.

Moreover, I would like to react on the following “Weighted voting is least contentious in systems where participants cannot directly influence the vote of their peers”. Whereas I agree with this I would like to point out the fact that while the EC would influence the ANO vote weight the contrary is not true.

I can see a real value in an EC establishing the main priorities of the protocol and proposing the best allocation of the resources. But I am wondering whether we should make the EC play a more political role. Mixing execution and politics is not necessary and it could on the contrary decrease the efficiency of this committee.

It will certainly lead to “Double-counting vote” suspicions (members of the EC and the corresponding ANOs) followed by “boy’s club” accusations. This is something the community has experienced in the past.

[EDIT: I have noticed the messages on this topic from Saul and Vidal]

Nevertheless, I understand the need for more objective criteria. That is why I would prefer a % of the ANO standing depending on technical objective metrics (which could be defined by the Diagnostics Committee) and the rest by the ANOs, along with a simplified efficiency system (see next section).

In any case, should this system be retained, in the spirit of the document (“a percentage which retains the power of [ANOs] to overturn by a majority…”), a healthy rule would be to limit the power of one entity not to define by itself the vote weight of another one. Therefore, I would recommend at least to limit the EC weight to 20% specifically if vote delegation is expected from other ANOs. Thus, the EC + 1 ANO are necessary to pass from “Good standing” to “Improvement needed”. T

The introduction of a Community Secretary with a neutral position is also a smart addition to the whole system.

Adding a new standing party such as the token holders would have our preference in order to limit the risk for the ANOs to protect themselves.

Efficiency
Since M3 the efficiency topic has been a hot one. The simplification proposed in this proposal is good and I will go even further to “kill” this topic with only 1 server at 0% efficiency for all the ANOs. This would significantly increase the resources of the grant pool.

With the introduction of a community Roadmap and an EC, this is the perfect momentum to go this way. There is no discussion in the need for allocating more resources to common protocol objectives. When grantees who did not deliver on self-defined grants were asking for more grant resources in the past such a proposal was not acceptable. In the context on this specific proposal, it perfectly makes sense.

Committees
Why do you want to marginalize the Diagnostics Committee? 😊 As it has been pointed out on Discord a vote of 0.5 or 1 does make any difference anyway. So let give them 1 in the EC.
[EDIT : this has now been taken into consideration]

A last little remark on the format: I recommend to reserve the term “Standing Parties” when designating all the standing parties and not only the ANOs.

To summarize:
  • Thanks a lot for this proposal !
  • Efficiency: We would support a more radical change to 1 server at 0% for all ANOs
  • EC power: We would limit the EC power to the Roadmap and Community Resource management (which is already a massive power)
  • Standing system: we would introduce pure technical metrics in each ANO standing and propose directly as a next step the vote of token holders to diversify the vote sources through DPoS (instead of the EC which is here used as an ersatz toward this objective). There is no more reason to restrain the DPoS implementation. The US legislation has been presented in the past as the main brake to this feature (this to complete Mike Miller’s message). I am not sure this is a valid reason anymore.
  • Frédéric and myself would be happy to actively participate in the diagnostics and governance committees.
There are for sure still details to be defined but this first iteration is a very consistent one. I personally highly appreciate this effort to make our protocol more efficient. DPoS may be our next objective, but whatever our next step is, we need to define the structure to reach it. The proposed roadmap and the EC are necessary tools for this.
 
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I think this thread shows different approaches. Given it is the single biggest change since M3, a period where different parties provided a lot of input to come to a proposal, I really believe this approach of giving the okay to something this big will not work. Which would be a waste of effort. Why not have some different groups work out different proposals and then have broader discussions about it?

I know of at least 3 different approaches and potential starts of proposals. I think it might make sense to give parties 1 or 2 weeks and see which parts could be taken as input for m4. I personally think this proposal with the way it is organized and the vote at hand will not make it. Do we want to risk that and people involved being demotivated or does it make sense to have some additional proposal and components and then have the discussion about it?
Thank you for your post. As we have strongly advocated, this proposal subscribes to an iterative model of change. Adoption of this proposal does not preclude others from conducting research, raising an issue, publicly organizing and forming a working group, drafting and editing proposals that seek working group consensus through deliberation and compromise, producing supporting documentation, and presenting it to the community for discussion and ratification.

Since the Factomize proposal to remove guides passed, this effort to create a revised framework to correct (and remove if prudent) community obstacles to include organization, policy, procedure, and protocols has been on going. The need and mandate were discussed very publicly; volunteers were requested, and several community members stepped up to the calling, willing to dedicate their time and experience for the betterment of the community. They publicly organized in an open working group to brainstorm, argue, organize and examine all aspects of our governance under the aim to create a cohesive, complementary, rapidly-executable, and low/no cost plan that mitigates or resolves the key issues that have historically lead to Factom underperforming and those factors that have held-back our ability to make decisions and commit to action.

This proposal is the result of that work. There were hundreds of other ideas and arguments that were either removed or discarded throughout the process. Several proposals were written, re-written, consolidated, and then rewritten again. This is not a proposal to make everyone feel good – it is a proposal to save the parts of what we’ve built that work, and fix the parts that don’t so we a chance to surviving and just maybe thriving into the future.

That being said, the governance structure we propose not only will allow future changes and adjustments, but also should create a more effective means to form such working groups in the future that can leverage the support of the proposed committees. It should make future decisions easier to consider, enhance community participation, improve proposal quality, significantly enhance the ability of the community to make decisions, and allow for oversight of the implementations of those decisions.

What you are asking for already happened and resulted in this proposal. Delay and an inability to decide and evolve is only more of the same, and is the story of how we arrived here. The community’s failing to act and inability to come to a consensus prolongs the status quo, which we know hasn’t worked. It’s frustrating, unnecessary, and damaging. We’ve never suffered from a lack of ideas. Our failures have often been the inability to decide, act, and fully commit to implementation.

You’ve been one of the community’s most prominent members leading and steering this project since M3. You know, possibly more than all of us the damage that our inability to decide and act has had. Countless times, we’ve sacrificed the good (sometimes even the great) ideas brought to this community striving for the 100% inclusive and “perfect” solution, only to result in stagnation, broken promises, disappointment, gridlock, apathy, ANOs blaming other ANOs for blocking progress, etc. It creates an environment that alienates, disenfranchises, and undermines nearly every imitative we as community seek to achieve.

You ask if a strategic pause is warranted to create a unifying solution of all ideas. My answer is no. Not this time. It’s too important. In these trying times and in the state we’re in we have to take the great plan and with vigor move forward stronger, better organized, and empowered. That might not be enough, and we will always need to remain committed to evolving to make our system work better, this proposal does that. Under this proposal, future proposals should and will be encouraged, demanded, and considered. Approving this proposal only strengthens our ability to timely and effectively change in the future.
 
Let me start first by a big thank you to all of you guys to bring this proposal on the table. It brings back optimism to all of us and makes the reality of healthier discussions back again.
Thanks. That's always been one of the goals.

Your analysis is outstanding, by the way. I'll clear up some of the questions you have.

It is not explicit but I do expect these committees to be open to the whole community. Is that correct?
That's right. Another thing that's not explicit is committee size. Based on my own personal experience, I would prefer a cap to keep them from getting too large. Capped membership allows for competition (parties should vie to be in committees to influence the 32% vote). Committees could also opt for a rotation system (which would help alleviate the workload for those who are so concerned about it. I guess I would see it as a possibility that parties 'serve' in a committee for a while and are rotated).

I also understand that this is also accompanied by a recommendation: that ANOs resign their ability to cast individual standing determination.
You're the first person to comment on one of the choices we've presented to the community. ANOs keep their ability for standing determinations (with option to emulate EC votes) or it's done exclusively by the EC. We're not going to make that decision, but we'll explain the pros and cons for both.

This recommendation looks paradoxical with the will of offsetting the “curator risk” by maintaining a balance of power between parties. So here are my first questions:

  • Could you clarify how you imagine in practice this standing system?
  • Do you expect most of the ANOs to delegate their vote power to the EC?
  • What dynamic do you envision with such a system?
The EC doesn't have ultimate power over the standing reviews by my definition, even if it would be the sole party to cast that determination. Remember, the scoring is done by the committees on a quarterly basis, which is comprised of ANOs. All the EC does is tally those scores and vote. So ANO involvement will always be there, regardless if the standing reviews are cast by 25 parties or 1 party.

As for delegation, that depends on your model. If you're talking about the emulation, that's a kind of 'soft' delegation where ANOs have a third option added in the Standing Dashboard. "Reaffirm Standing", "Remove Support", "Emulate EC vote".

This has been discussed with Belazor and it's technically doable (as is all the rest, e.g. weighted voting). I expect a growing number of ANOs to use the emulation option as the EC gains trust over time. That trust won't be there from the onset. To help build that trust, the EC (and committees) need to pursue fairness and objectivity in their scoring.

What I envision here is that we finally have a fully operational Standing system based on a scoring system that is fair and uniform. Individual ANO power is respected, but emulation is encouraged and it furthers participation because any ANOs who were previously short on time to cast informed votes can now do so at the click of a single button.

This frees up a great deal of time while adding to informedness. You would normally think these two terms are mutually exclusive. I think this is an elegant way to solve that.

Nevertheless, I understand the need for more objective criteria. That is why I would prefer a % of the ANO standing depending on technical objective metrics
Objective criteria are very important for any scoring done by committees and therefore the EC.

There is some literature on this:

‘Assessment of merit necessarily involves human judgment about the contributions of individual candidates. But information about and opinions of those contributions may differ considerably in a voting population. Part of our goal is to confront the analytic challenge of combining relevant information and opinions in a way that assists the overall assessment of candidates in a meritocracy vote. Our approach is to construct a methodology for combining “objective” and “subjective” information for use in such voting and to broaden the availability of that information during the voting process.’ (source)

There's been great discussion about objective measures in the past by the likes of @Saul Schwartzbach and this is something the new committees and EC need to pursue immediately. Not only to reduce contention, but also to improve the emulation rate by other ANOs.

The availability of information used during the voting process is enhanced by having the Diagnostics committee (for the technical objective metrics you speak of) and by having efficient dissemination by the Community Secretary.
 
Thank you for your post. As we have strongly advocated, this proposal subscribes to an iterative model of change. Adoption of this proposal does not preclude others from conducting research, raising an issue, publicly organizing and forming a working group, drafting and editing proposals that seek working group consensus through deliberation and compromise, producing supporting documentation, and presenting it to the community for discussion and ratification.

Since the Factomize proposal to remove guides passed, this effort to create a revised framework to correct (and remove if prudent) community obstacles to include organization, policy, procedure, and protocols has been on going. The need and mandate were discussed very publicly; volunteers were requested, and several community members stepped up to the calling, willing to dedicate their time and experience for the betterment of the community. They publicly organized in an open working group to brainstorm, argue, organize and examine all aspects of our governance under the aim to create a cohesive, complementary, rapidly-executable, and low/no cost plan that mitigates or resolves the key issues that have historically lead to Factom underperforming and those factors that have held-back our ability to make decisions and commit to action.

This proposal is the result of that work. There were hundreds of other ideas and arguments that were either removed or discarded throughout the process. Several proposals were written, re-written, consolidated, and then rewritten again. This is not a proposal to make everyone feel good – it is a proposal to save the parts of what we’ve built that work, and fix the parts that don’t so we a chance to surviving and just maybe thriving into the future.

That being said, the governance structure we propose not only will allow future changes and adjustments, but also should create a more effective means to form such working groups in the future that can leverage the support of the proposed committees. It should make future decisions easier to consider, enhance community participation, improve proposal quality, significantly enhance the ability of the community to make decisions, and allow for oversight of the implementations of those decisions.

What you are asking for already happened and resulted in this proposal. Delay and an inability to decide and evolve is only more of the same, and is the story of how we arrived here. The community’s failing to act and inability to come to a consensus prolongs the status quo, which we know hasn’t worked. It’s frustrating, unnecessary, and damaging. We’ve never suffered from a lack of ideas. Our failures have often been the inability to decide, act, and fully commit to implementation.

You’ve been one of the community’s most prominent members leading and steering this project since M3. You know, possibly more than all of us the damage that our inability to decide and act has had. Countless times, we’ve sacrificed the good (sometimes even the great) ideas brought to this community striving for the 100% inclusive and “perfect” solution, only to result in stagnation, broken promises, disappointment, gridlock, apathy, ANOs blaming other ANOs for blocking progress, etc. It creates an environment that alienates, disenfranchises, and undermines nearly every imitative we as community seek to achieve.

You ask if a strategic pause is warranted to create a unifying solution of all ideas. My answer is no. Not this time. It’s too important. In these trying times and in the state we’re in we have to take the great plan and with vigor move forward stronger, better organized, and empowered. That might not be enough, and we will always need to remain committed to evolving to make our system work better, this proposal does that. Under this proposal, future proposals should and will be encouraged, demanded, and considered. Approving this proposal only strengthens our ability to timely and effectively change in the future.
Jason, I agree with many points; except for the absolute hurry all of a sudden after 2 years, several months of the Governance WG coming up with this proposal. Historically these really big changes have happened in the open. As I mentioned I have already heard of several people working on different proposals altogether. In times where you want to change everything around I think it is prudent to take 2 weeks to listen to other approaches, instead of giving 1 okay to a single proposal that still needs an awful lot of refinement but does mold us into a single governance approach.
 
Jason, I agree with many points; except for the absolute hurry all of a sudden after 2 years, several months of the Governance WG coming up with this proposal. Historically these really big changes have happened in the open. As I mentioned I have already heard of several people working on different proposals altogether. In times where you want to change everything around I think it is prudent to take 2 weeks to listen to other approaches, instead of giving 1 okay to a single proposal that still needs an awful lot of refinement but does mold us into a single governance approach.
The onus to seek collaboration is on those who are working on proposals secretly, because there's really no way for us to know about them. One reason for the GWG to exist was so that any party with any good ideas could pass them by us.

We've been very open about our own proposal. And now it just so happens we've completed it, so we posted it.

See some statements below:

Formation thread on March 13th (four months ago!):
1. Facilitate and improve governance.
2. Perform concurrent work on a full proposal to introduce a new Standing Party. There's a lot of overlap between what people want. Let's get a dedicated group on this.
First GWG update, March 23rd:

The primary focus of the group is to enable improvements that make governance more effective. However firstly we need some first-aid to ensure the removal of the guide role does not leave gaps, a task we aim to complete within a few weeks. In parallel, we will progress governance development.
June 5th:
Whilst we may appear to have been quiet in the last few weeks, we have been actively considering the next steps for Factom’s Governance. This started with an assessment of the protocol’s governance challenges, was followed by a period of research into a range of potential solutions and culminated in a selection of solutions which together address a number of our current problems. We are building on what others have created, while also creating a stronger foundation for further, future iterations. Consistent with our new Governance Development Framework, this proposal is now embodied in a Concept paper we aim to publish to the community via Factomize by 11 June.
On June 11th, we learned of Kompendium's ideas, and decided to work together:
We stated above that we aimed to publish a Concept paper outlining the next steps for Factom’s Governance by 11 June. This is to advise that we have received some very recent and well considered suggestions about this piece of work which we feel honor-bound to review and incorporate as appropriate. This will take a little while and means we cannot publish this paper today. We will keep you informed about progress.
Not to mention all of the internal GWG discussions, of which you were a part. So if you knew of any other proposals, you could have brought it up then and there. I would have worked with anyone, as evidenced by our Kompendium partnership.
 
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This is not about who did what when IMO. I agree people working on proposals need to come forward. But I also believe that everybody should make decisions well informed.

In the past we have seen open discussions before moving into a more formal vote. This is the single biggest change since M3 and I think it would be wise to have an open discussion first instead of having to vote for a single proposal.

Please note I am not discounting effort or intentions or anything. I am merely a bit surprised that the single biggest change to governance is brought forward in a vote immediately. People can say it still needs a lot of work, but the contours are pretty much set in the proposal.
 
This is not about who did what when IMO. I agree people working on proposals need to come forward. But I also believe that everybody should make decisions well informed.

Please note I am not discounting effort or intentions or anything. I am merely a bit surprised that the single biggest change to governance is brought forward in a vote immediately. People can say it still needs a lot of work, but the contours are pretty much set in the proposal.
This is the Community-produced revamped governance proposal up for discussion and a vote. It is meant to improve nearly every aspect of how our community operates. As you say, it offers change, some of it, able to be actioned quickly. We can make an informed decision by considering the past and the present, then projecting the course of the protocol into the future. As described, approval of this proposal does not exclude the iterative implementation of future changes. Indeed, it is a near certainty that members of our community will have future ideas able to make us stronger and more competitive in the marketplace. And through the framework provided in this proposal, these ideas will be able to involve the community, generate Working Groups and ultimately be voted on and adopted as appropriate.

What is provided here is such a plan. It’s a plan to optimize community functionality and align efforts, information flow, and resources to enable effective and decisive decision-making and the execution of a community-supported road map to break from the status quo and empower us to move towards a more promising future. When, not if, but when in the future other compelling proposals are presented for community consideration, they will be reviewed and heard. That is not the reality we face right now. Right now the Community GWG announced, promised, and actually delivered a proposal, it is presented for discussion and a vote. IMO, every day that passes is a day lost, with the community falling further in the wrong direction, powerless to change its fate. Approving this proposal gives us that power back AS WELL AS the enduring power to change to ensure Factom remains optimally organized for success. Approving this proposal now risks almost nothing, delaying or worse rejecting it could risk everything. We all have a choice.
 
Is there any confirmation of teams working on alternate proposals in parallel to what has been proposed here by the GWG? If so, those proposals should be brought forward immediately, so we can discuss and combine the best ideas from them all.

However, we can not wait until we all collectively agree on a perfect end solution. We need to focus the discussion around the next stepping stone, not the ideal Utopian vision for the future. I think that this proposal should be broken down into bite size chunks to each to be debated, voted on, and implemented separately. The most pressing and time sensitive aspects of this proposal should go up for discussion/vote first, as the community will likely not survive the endless debate that a proposal this large will ensue.

Establishing a governance road map if you will, we can then give each section of the proposal the time and attention it deserves, in an order of importance/time sensitivity. This will also allow us to be strategic in implementation, and allow for a smooth transition to new governance measures and community norms. I believe that this approach will yield sweeter fruit, and incur less friction.
 
Is there any confirmation of teams working on alternate proposals in parallel to what has been proposed here by the GWG? If so, those proposals should be brought forward immediately, so we can discuss and combine the best ideas from them all.

However, we can not wait until we all collectively agree on a perfect end solution. We need to focus the discussion around the next stepping stone, not the ideal Utopian vision for the future. I think that this proposal should be broken down into bite size chunks to each to be debated, voted on, and implemented separately. The most pressing and time sensitive aspects of this proposal should go up for discussion/vote first, as the community will likely not survive the endless debate that a proposal this large will ensue.

Establishing a governance road map if you will, we can then give each section of the proposal the time and attention it deserves, in an order of importance/time sensitivity. This will also allow us to be strategic in implementation, and allow for a smooth transition to new governance measures and community norms. I believe that this approach will yield sweeter fruit, and incur less friction.

Hi Saul, thank you for your comments.

You are absolutely right that we cannot afford to wait.

This proposal puts into place a system of methodical decision-making that has regularly and wisely been called for by you and others because we have failed to do this in the past.

It will be underpinned by capable committees, absolutely focused on what we need to do. Importantly it enables ANOs to get busy creating value for the community. Disecting this proposal in the ways we have tried in the past could take weeks to months and lead to dismay, gridlock, alienation, and apathy further pushing some ANOs so far out to the sidelines that they either leave the ecosystem or never actively participate again. We can’t do the same thing over and over and expect different results. A powerful aspect of this proposal is how the changes work together, cherry-picking risks undermining the entire construct.

There are no other proposals in sight. Multiple proposals were brought to the working group, the proposal before us comes from a hard fought combination of these. There may be other untested ideas, but this is the only proposal that has been rigorously and collaboratively worked on, examined, publicly reviewed and available to be voted on now. This is not a brainstorming session but a choice of whether we put in the necessary governance framework now which will create the opportunity to consider and choose the path we pursue in the future.
 
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I posted this in the other discussion thread as well, but for those who have remained focused here on critically important governance decision, I thought I would report, as the vote on the GWG proposal opens in less than 24 hours.

I’ve now read federate POS document at least five separate times and I'd like to state—as the document’s authors themselves admit in the document—that the document is not a governance proposal. It’s a first draft of some ideas that are primarily technology focused. More time, care, and research need to be invested to build this set of ideas into an implementable proposal for debate and community consideration. The only way to give this set of ideas and other ideas surely across and within the community the due consideration they require is through the newly proposed governance structure which people now have a chance to vote on right here, now.

I, and likely several others, intend to pause submitting questions and comments concerning the other document until after he outcome of this GWG proposal vote.

Given the critical importance and significant ramifications of the governance proposal vote, I strongly recommend we as a community return focus to the governance proposal to ensure we all have read and fully understand the issues facing the community, and how this proposal aims to resolve them. If we pass this proposal, there are those ready to string forward and put this into action. As I’ve said before, we risk so little approving this proposal, denying it may risk everything.

We can come back to these other ideas afterwards, with hopefully a more effective, purposed, and organized community and be in a far better position to discuss and develop our strategy and community road map, which could include some of the ideas recently presented. As stewards of the community we’re obligated to vote. Please make an informed and considerate choice.
 
Can we get some clarity about what voting yes here will mean?

I do think that this needs more than just a yes in a poll, and a few issues need to be addressed. We need to come together on the governance changes we want. So I don't want to vote "no" here and throw the baby out with the bath water. But I don't want to vote "yes" and not nail down all the various details that I haven't had time to think through, and I am pretty sure the community hasn't either.
 
A yes vote here will start the implementation of this plan. The working group will be going through and updating all the goverance documents to conform to this proposal. Each will require approval.

Discussion on points can be done as documents are modified. Of course (and this is my fear) this proposal's approach will be the default. So deviation from the proposal will have the burden of proof in those discussions.

I do think some of this is very good. Some of it looks like heightened risk of politics. Lots of hard work went into this for sure, and no matter what we need to keep the value in this work.

I've some thinking to do here.
 
Same as @PaulSnow . I like some of the changes but I am not sure about some. Couldn't this proposal be split into several?

Example :

1. I like the idea of comitee having some weight
2. I think we will see politics around the payout treshold. There is not enough differentiation between ANOs and this could get ugly. Some ANO with pretty much the same standing will receive 2x the amount than their fellow ANO.


Why do I have to accept 2 if I want 1 only? I feel voting yes for the whole package is going to tie us into this with the onous on us to make any tiny change.
 
Same as @PaulSnow . I like some of the changes but I am not sure about some. Couldn't this proposal be split into several?

Example :

1. I like the idea of comitee having some weight
2. I think we will see politics around the payout treshold. There is not enough differentiation between ANOs and this could get ugly. Some ANO with pretty much the same standing will receive 2x the amount than their fellow ANO.


Why do I have to accept 2 if I want 1 only? I feel voting yes for the whole package is going to tie us into this with the onous on us to make any tiny change.
Did you see the disclaimer we added to that section? Voting yes does not approve the efficiency changes.
These polls are sometimes kinda limiting when the issue at hand isn't really binary.
A binary option is much needed. Voting yes supports a subsequent step of getting each section ready for implementation. That next step involves a lot of discussion, a lot of engagement.

The problem with non-binary votes is that Factom governance has no defined quotas in place for when something is deemed accepted. We could have four options each having 5 votes. That wouldn't tell us anything. So the idea is to get overall support first, then take sections and examine them.

FAQ will be posted soon!
 
Did you see the disclaimer we added to that section? Voting yes does not approve the efficiency changes.


A binary option is much needed. Voting yes supports a subsequent step of getting each section ready for implementation. That next step involves a lot of discussion, a lot of engagement.

The problem with non-binary votes is that Factom governance has no defined quotas in place for when something is deemed accepted. We could have four options each having 5 votes. That wouldn't tell us anything. So the idea is to get overall support first, then take sections and examine them.

FAQ will be posted soon!
This is the risk I'm talking about. I like the idea of delegation of tasks to interested parties by ANOs. I don't like the potential for abuse when those delegated parties can control and even eliminate influence of the ANOs.

Much of how this "incentivises" behavior is based on assumptions that may not hold up. I get that it all works if we are all working together, but I worry when evidence of factions already exists, and I worry about what happens to others when a faction of ANOs has control of this process.

The current system doesn't limit what we can do, our resources and revenue does. And change is better than doing nothing, and that speaks to supporting this effort. It at least is change.

But what if we need change again? Can we displace a EC that controls 32% of the influence? Composed of the leaders of the major committees? Maybe? But if not, this change will be the one we live with going forward. But maybe it can be challenged like the guides were?

That's my struggle here.
 
The current system doesn't limit what we can do, our resources and revenue does. And change is better than doing nothing, and that speaks to supporting this effort. It at least is change.
Yeah, change is good right now. If it's well-considered. The current system has run its course in many ways.

But what if we need change again? Can we displace a EC that controls 32% of the influence?
Yep. Appendix B of the proposal has a vote simulation. The first simulation has equal vote weight among ANOs like we do now. It means you'd need around 75% of ANOS to overturn an EC vote. Absent parties who don't vote can be a roadblock, so in the second simulation we show how tying standing to vote weight makes a difference and you'd need less ANOs to overturn an EC vote.

It has some assumptions. The main one being that those with lower standing have worse vote records (not voting at all).

Like Anton said, I'm open to thoughts on how the power gets distributed.

I appreciate all the feedback by the way. It's worth adding that I see some concerns about the scope of it all. That's by design. Say we limited our proposal to just the introduction of weighted votes for ANOs. We'd get an entire discussion about the need for a more rigid standing system. We've had more discussions about that than I can count, none of which ever resulted in anything. As a full proposal, we cover everything, so we can jump straight to the merit of individual sections and not get too side-tracked about the what ifs.
 
Could the committees nominate a candidate for the EC that is external to them? That would provide some flexibility going forward.

Like Core committee could nominate Paul Snow to have a seat in the EC?

Because Again - talking about expertise - e.g maybe the core committee doesn’t have someone capable or willing to do a political role.
 
Yeah, change is good right now. If it's well-considered. The current system has run its course in many ways.



Yep. Appendix B of the proposal has a vote simulation. The first simulation has equal vote weight among ANOs like we do now. It means you'd need around 75% of ANOS to overturn an EC vote. Absent parties who don't vote can be a roadblock, so in the second simulation we show how tying standing to vote weight makes a difference and you'd need less ANOs to overturn an EC vote.
The problem I see with EC % is that, if this proposal goes through the way it is, I think it is very likely that ANOs are going to be trimmed out of the pool fairly quickly (more quickly than now) and be brought down to 10-16 ANO as some have suggested in the near past. In a case like this (which wasn't simulated), it is going to be virtually impossible to overthrow or restrain the EC/ANOs power.
 
I agree - more simulation would be helpful.

Majority of votes is 100-0. So if there is a need to overdo the EC, I think it’s very doable, unless it’s not as clear cut.

It’s also possible to go through the committee to change the EC candidate themselves.

There should be limited cases where the EC doesn’t represent the community as a whole.

But it also is meant to make effective decisions that we weren’t quite able to do ourselves - such as the standing system.
 
The problem I see with EC % is that, if this proposal goes through the way it is, I think it is very likely that ANOs are going to be trimmed out of the pool fairly quickly (more quickly than now) and be brought down to 10-16 ANO as some have suggested in the near past. In a case like this (which wasn't simulated), it is going to be virtually impossible to overthrow or restrain the EC/ANOs power.
Could you elaborate? The ANO class would stay at 68% voting power regardless of how many parties it has. The relative weight of remaining ANOs (the ones with high standing and thereby informed, good voting records) would go up. The EC weight stays the same.

If any ANOs get trimmed, it's the ones who are absent whose vote is actually a detriment to the active ANO trying to overturn the EC.

I welcome anyone to toy with this voting model.

Removal of around 5-6 parties with lower standing (who cast abstain votes/miss votes) moves the needle in favor of ANOs.
 
Yep. Appendix B of the proposal has a vote simulation. The first simulation has equal vote weight among ANOs like we do now. It means you'd need around 75% of ANOS to overturn an EC vote. Absent parties who don't vote can be a roadblock, so in the second simulation we show how tying standing to vote weight makes a difference and you'd need less ANOs to overturn an EC vote.
The system allows for demoting ANOs and their weight. For example, Factom Inc isn't popular. So despite a 50% efficiency and being one of the most active ANOs in developing usage of the protocol, and being one of the best promoting the peotocol with enterprise users (this is even true as we absolutely are in a struggle over resources) we would have limited voice in this system.

So the EC can (just assume the worst) make sure the ANOs that have voice are those that "play ball".

Like Anton said, I'm open to thoughts on how the power gets distributed.
I think that's the main thing this vote sets in stone though.

But if you end up the power broker in the EC world, maybe that's good?

I'm not knocking you, just looking at the possibility of a dystopian future.

I appreciate all the feedback by the way. It's worth adding that I see some concerns about the scope of it all. That's by design. Say we limited our proposal to just the introduction of weighted votes for ANOs. We'd get an entire discussion about the need for a more rigid standing system. We've had more discussions about that than I can count, none of which ever resulted in anything. As a full proposal, we cover everything, so we can jump straight to the merit of individual sections and not get too side-tracked about the what ifs.
I oppose even the standing system we have now. We started beating up on each other when we need to pull together. I'd hate to formalize fighting each other for influence in the protocol forever.

What I could get behind is moving this whole proposal into a google doc, open for comments to everyone, and punching through everything. But I also understand why the current group of people behind this proposal are tired and just want to get past it. And now you are faced with new blood with only a week into your work wanting to pick it all apart.

Not like I haven't been there a few times.
 
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@PaulSnow I think it's fair point you explained about ANO's popularity.
But at the same time I also think, that reducing voting power of parties, who's support is below required minimum (50% currently), is necessary feature that we should implement.
TL;DR; We may consider the model where ANOs with 50%+ support have equal weights of votes and ANOs with <50% support have less powerful votes. Anyone sees any issues with this approach? @WB @Mike Buckingham
 
The system allows for demoting ANOs and their weight. For example, Factom Inc isn't popular. So despite a 50% efficiency and being one of the most active ANOs in developing usage of the protocol, and being one of the best promoting the peotocol with enterprise users (this is even true as we absolutely are in a struggle over resources) we would have limited voice in this system.
That depends on how we score you. Again, this is the inevitable discussion if I were to exclusively introduced weighted votes and nothing else. You'd worry about how you get scored, because right now it's not fair.

That's why we added committee-based scoring with the pursuit of fair metrics and better reporting. If Factom Inc would also serve on a committee, that'd be another bonus.

So that's why this is actually a pretty comprehensive proposal. Because one thing leads to another!

This proposal is not designed with the current standing evaluations in mind. The evaluations will be fair, based on actual work performed, not on past grudges. We don't want to remove an ANOs individual ability to cast standing votes, so we allow EC emulation.
 
Could the committees nominate a candidate for the EC that is external to them? That would provide some flexibility going forward.

Like Core committee could nominate Paul Snow to have a seat in the EC?
I think so. It would be silly to have amazing talent lined up and not use it. I'd maybe prefer that person to take place inside the committee and step up to the EC from there. Shorter lines and all that. Those are just formalities, though.
 
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